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important due to a rapid growth in potential users, and a lack of a central coordinator among WBANs that
are closely located. In this paper, we propose a TDMA based MAC layer Scheme, with a back-off mechanism
that reduces packet collision probability; and estimate performance using a Markov chain model. Based on
the MAC layer scheme, a novel non-cooperative game is proposed to jointly adjust sensor node’s transmit
power and rate. In comparison with the state-of-art, simulation that includes empirical data shows that the
proposed approach leads to higher throughput and longer node lifespan as WBAN wearers dynamically move
into each other’s vicinity. Moreover, by adaptively tuning contention windows size an alternative game is
developed, which significantly reduces the latency. Both proposed games provide robust transmission under
strong inter-WBAN interferences, but are demonstrated to be applicable to different scenarios. The uniqueness
and existence of Nash Equilibrium (NE), as well as close-to-optimum social efficiency, is also proven for both
games.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Wireless body area networks (WBANs) are an integral part of affordable, flexible and proactive
wearable health-care to reduce costs and improve people’s quality of life. Recent advances in
wireless communications and sensor hardware mean that WBANs are feasible implementations.
The IEEE 802.15.6 standard approved in 2012 for wireless communication in WBANs aims to serve
a variety of medical, entertainment, military and consumer electronics applications. IEEE 802.15.6
only outlined basic requirements with a choice of multiple MAC layer techniques — i.e., scheduled
access, polling, and contention access — supported in a beacon-based superframe. However, with a
rapid increase in active devices, which predicted to be well over a billion by 2018 [9], WBANs will
suffer unavoidable inter-WBAN interference from closely-located coexisting WBANs due to no
central coordinator amongst networks.
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Moreover, WBAN radios have limited battery capacity due to sensor/actuator devices small
sizes, but health monitoring applications require long battery life-time, as removing, charging
and replacing batteries can be very inconvenient and difficult. Because inter-WBAN interference
can cause performance degradation and energy wastage of low-power sensor nodes, and sensors
radio transmit power is strictly constrained, inter-WBAN interference is a major issue, where most
energy wastage occurs in the wireless transceiver. Hence, a well-designed MAC layer protocol for
transmission scheduling is of paramount importance to prolong network lifetime and improve the
robustness of WBAN communications by reducing periods of interference. Interference mitigation
schemes have been widely studied for other networks, such as traditional cellular networks and
wireless sensor networks, but such schemes can not be directly implemented in WBANs. This is
because WBANs have relatively high mobility, compared with other networks where gateway
devices are typically stationary, leading to unique features of practical WBAN coexistence that
require new approaches specifically designed for WBANs.
Existing literatures on MAC protocols for WBANs demonstrate that CSMA/CA protocols en-
counter unreliable CCA issues and heavy collision [30]. On the other hand, TDMA has proven to be
more reliable and power efficient[35]. Therefore, here, we propose a game-theoretic formulation of a
TDMA-based MAC protocol to achieve energy efficiency, reduce inter-BAN interference, improve overall
throughput and reduce latency across all co-existing WBANs. The proposed method adapts to the
time-varying channel and traffic by optimizing the transmission schedule. Depending on the special
random back-off mechanism to minimize the probability of packets collision among sensors in
different WBANs, the overall interference level can be consequently reduced. Besides, each WBANs
is treated as an active player in a non-cooperative game. In each superframe, the transmission
parameters, such as, transmit power, transmit probability and data rate, are determined based on a
utility function, which admits a unique Nash Equilibrium. By maximizing the utility function, a
higher throughput can be achieved, and the latency and power consumption is reduced.
Hence, the main contributions of this paper are:
– A novel MAC layer timing protocol to reduce inter-BAN interference by adapting back-off in
TDMA.
– A Markov chain is constructed to provide performance evaluation.
– A non-cooperative game is proposed to jointly tune transmit power and data rate to improve
throughput and reduce latency.
– Based on the Markov chain, an Adaptive Backoff Game is proposed for better Quality of
Service (QoS) performance.
– The two games are demonstrated to reduce radio interference by improving throughput, in
conjunction with reduced power and delay.
The proposed method has two principal features: (i) a novel MAC layer protocol and (ii) game
theoretic power control. The MAC layer protocol focuses on rescheduling unsuccessfully transmit-
ted packets to reduce the probability of packet collision among different co-located WBANs. Two
games are proposed for power control: a rate-and-power game and a Adaptive Backoff Game (as an
extension of the Link Adaptation Game). The Link Adaptation Game tuning the node’s transmit
power and data rate from the Nash equilibrium of its utility function to obtain optimized throughput
(in terms of Packer Delivery Ratio, PDR) and power consumption. In the Adaptive Backoff Game,
the sensor node adjusts its transmit probability by dynamically changing the contention parameters
(contention window size), to further improve throughput performance and minimize transmission
delay. Due to the difference in delay performance and power consumption, a tradeoff of the two
games can be made according to WBAN application.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related literature will be reviewed in Section
2. The proposed MAC layer scheme, as well as the analytical model, will be described in detail
in Section 3. The two proposed game theory methods will be depicted in Section 4 and Section 5
respectively. The performance of the proposed methods will be illustrated in Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
In literature, many studies have been proposed to mitigate inter-WBAN radio interference, in three
main categories:
– Transmit power control
– MAC layer scheduling
– Data rate and power control
2.1 Transmit Power Control
Several pioneering works on inter-WBAN interference mitigation focus on solutions at the physical
layer. Many techniques involve transmission power control that is based on a centralized and
partially distributed [34] approach. These techniques are proven to be effective for networks with
stable topologies and fewer power constraints[21]. However, more recently, game-theoretic power
control, incorporating pricing factors in utility functions, e.g., [36], [19], has been shown to improve
QoS in wireless networks. Due to the general lack of a central coordinator in WBANs, transmit
power control must be adopted in a distributed manner across co-located WBANs. In recent
studies, WBANs have been modeled as rational players competing for resources in non-cooperative
power-control games, [8] [33].
2.2 MAC layer
Recently, several MAC layer protocols that seek to solve the inter-WBAN interference problems
[5] [23] [24] have been proposed. The work in [5] uses cooperative schemes to suppress the
inter-WBAN interference, where a random incomplete coloring (RIC) algorithm is proposed to
realize a fast and high spatial-reuse for inter-WBAN scheduling. In [23], a mixed graph coloring
is used for interference mitigation among WBANs, where the proposed method pairs every two
WBANs into a cluster and uses cooperative scheduling between the pairs in each cluster to reduce
interference. Node-level scheduling is considered in [24] to increase spatial reuse. However, these
methods only work for fixed topologies in the network. To better cope with with the required
flexibility in WBAN implementations, in [4][12],[16], collision avoidance techniques, such as
beacon rescheduling, channel sensing and adaptive sleeping are used to improve the overall QoS
performance for interfering WBANs. Many energy efficient MAC protocols have been proposed,
such as [17], [18]. In B-MAC [26], the sender needs to broadcast a long preamble to be detected by
the right receiver to reduce power consumption, but this, however, incurs unnecessary transmission
overhead.
2.3 Data Rate and Power Control
Comparing with transmission power control schemes, the resource allocation methods tuning
some other parameters, such as transmission rate, the packet size and so on, have proven to be
more effective. Research interests in this area are emerging and some centralized methods [25]
have been proposed in recent studies. As for distributed algorithms, game theoretic approaches
are widely used. For cellular networks, [15] game theoretic schemes with multiple discrete code
rates or modulation schemes are proposed, which is also known as link adaptation [11]. The mobile
terminals updating power and rate by optimizing the Utility Function to Nash Equilibrium. This idea
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is further extended for wireless Ad hoc network in [13], a simple utility function only depending on
Signal to Interference and Noise Ratio (SINR) and the pricing is used. However, for WBANs, there
has been limited literature on this subject. [2] proposed transmission rate adaptation policy for
WBANs to improve the QoS by solving a convex optimization problem, but only dynamic postures
in WBANs channels are considered.
2.4 Overall IEEE 802.15.6 Requirements
As per the IEEE 802.15.6 standard for WBANs its requirements are as follows [1]:
• Bit rates in the range of 10 kBps to 10MBps should be supported via the WBAN links.
• Packet Delivery Rate (PDR) should be larger than 90% for a 256 octet payload for more than
95% of the best-performing links;
• Up to 256 nodes should be supported by each WBAN;
• Reliability, jitter and latency should be supported for specificWBAN applications. For instance,
medical applications and non-medical of WBANs require latency to be less than 125ms and
less than 250ms, respectively; whilst jitter should be less than 50ms;
• WBAN nodes should allow reliable communication in case of mobility scenarios for both
on-body and in-body communications;
• Up to 10 randomly distributed co-located WBAN networks should be supported in a 6 × 6m2
area.
3 OVERALL OF THE PROPOSED MAC SCHEME
Here, we propose a TDMA-based MAC protocol to achieve energy efficiency, reduce inter-WBAN
interference and obtain low delivery latency for co-existing WBANs. Depending on the special
random back-off mechanism to minimize the probability of packets collision among sensors in
different WBANs, the overall level of interference and power consumption can be consequently
reduced.
3.1 System Model
We consider star-topology WBANs that are closely located and coexisting. Each WBAN consists
of a single hub with multiple sensors as described in Fig 1. The hub is not energy-constrained, so
the energy consumption of the sensor is mainly considered. The hub facilitates the main WBAN
operations such as synchronization, re-transmission and determining transmission schedules.
As interference across all co-existing WBANs is the main reason for dropped-packets and energy
wastage, the following assumptions apply:
A1. All BANs are saturated, which means that they always have a packet to send (packer arrive
rate is 1).
A2. Interference-dominated, where packet loss due to additive noise is negligible.
A3. All hubs are not energy constrained
A4. Time-slots across every superframe are normalized to unity
Within each WBAN the sensor devices acquire data and use TDMA to transmit to the hub
to avoid idle-listening and overhearing. The intra-BAN interference is collision free when each
sensor is transmitting using round-robin scheduling. However, it is infeasible to implement central
coordinator among co-existing WBANs that are closely located. Thus, the transmission between
different WBANs can not be synchronized. Therefore, co-channel interference may arise due to
collisions amongst concurrent transmissions made by sensors in different WBANs.
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Table 1. Table of Notations
Symbols Description
N Number of WBANs
Ts Length of the superframe
Tb Length of the beacon
Tidle Length of the inactive period
Tpayload Length of the transmission period (payload)
Tack Length of the ACK
Tslot Length of a time slot
w Backoff counter
m Maximum Backoff Stage
λ Persistence coefficient
b Backoff Stage
W Contention window size
CWmin Minimum backoff length
CWmax Maximum backoff length
pf Probability of transmission failure
bi, j Stationary distribution
τ Probability of transmission in a randomly slot
pc Probability of packets collision
Rτ Normalization coefficient of τ
γ Signal to Noise and Interference ratio(SINR)
hii Intra-WBAN Channel gain
hi j Inter-WBAN Channel gain
σ Noise gain
Pi Transmit power of WBAN i
Ri Data rate of WBAN i
Ω Social Welfare
3.2 MAC Layer Specification
3.2.1 Superframe Structure. As described above, the sensors in each WBAN are synchronized by
periodic transmission of the superframe, with constant length Ts . Each superframe consists of a
beacon, ACK reception, several slots used for data transmission and an inactive (idle) period. The
beacon is configured to contain control information for broadcasting to sensors. The turnaround
time is negligible. After the reserved transmission slots followed by ACK reception, the remaining
slots in the superframe are considered as an inactive or idle period. The basic structure of the
superframe is depicted in Figure 2.
Each superframe starts with broadcasting a beacon packet from the hub to the sensors, which
consists of information for establishing links and synchronization. Due to Assumption A.3, the
probability that beacon or ACK is not received at the sensor is negligible, as the hub can apply
higher transmit power to avoid SINR outage. The beacon is immediately followed a data frame,
which mainly consist of up-link data traffic from the sensors to the hub.
3.2.2 Back-off Mechanism. In order to avoid collisions when many WBANs sharing the medium, a
back-off algorithm can be used in WBAN networks. Since, if a transmission fails due to interference,
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Fig. 1. System Model
Beacon Payload ACK
Superframe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Allocated Slots
Fig. 2. Superframe Structure
it is highly likely that a following transmission will also be blocked. Keeping the sensor in back-off
states for a shorter period of time will increase packet delivery ratio and reduce collision probability.
Fig.3 illustrates the back-off mechanism and the operation mode of the sensor. As depicted in
Fig.1, all the sensors may be in one of three different operation states: back-off state, transmission
state, and inactive state.
If the ACK is not received by the sensor till the end of a superframe, the sensor executes a
random backoff procedure before the next beacon is transmitted by the hub to reduce the collision
probabilities among WBANs.
During the random backoff procedure, each sensor set its backoff counterw as a random integer
uniformly distributed over the interval ofw ∈ [1,W ]. The valueW , namely Contention Window
size is determined by the Backoff stage b and the number of Maximum Backoff Stages m. The
Backoff stage b equals to the number of transmissions failed for the packet. At the first transmission
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Beacon Payload
Beacon Payload ACK
Beacon Payload ACKBackoff
Beacon Payload ACK
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Beacon Payload ACKWBAN1
WBAN2
WBAN3
Fig. 3. Timing Scheme and Operations
attempt,W is set as 0. After each unsuccessful transmission,W is set as theCWmin multiplied by the
persistence coefficient λ (W = λbCWmin), until it reach the maximum value CWmax = λmCWmin
(in this paper λ = 2). The value CWmin called minimum back-off length. The basic algorithms are
listed in Algorithm 1.
3.3 Markov Model
A Markov model was initially proposed by Bianchi for IEEE 802.11 DCF [3]. The model describes
the basic fundamental process of MAC layer scheme through a Markov chain. The model has been
extended in several directions.
In this section, we proposed a discrete-time Markov chain, which models the operation of
the proposed algorithm in the tagged WBAN and captures the key characteristics of the MAC
layer timing scheme, such as, superframe structure, and re-transmission mechanism. The Markov
chain model can help us investigate features of the proposed MAC layer timing scheme, such as
throughput and delay.
Figure 4. shows the state transition diagram of the Markov chain of the proposed MAC scheme.
In the Markov model, the state at time t for tagged WBAN is represented by the stochastic process
(b(t),w(t)). b(t),w(t) represent the back-off stage and the back-off counter respectively. Here,
b(t) ∈ [0,m] represents the back-off stage of the tagged WBAN at time t , wherem is the maximum
backoffs.w(t) represents the value of the backoff counter at time t .
Initially, the values of back-off counter and re-transmission counter are set to zero. In the back-off
stage, when the value of back-off counter reaches zero, the hub will re-transmit the packet. If the
transmission attempt is successful, the state will move to {0, 0}, (b(t )= 0,w(t ) = 0), and the WBAN
starts to transmit in the next frame after the in-active period. Otherwise, the sensor moves from
back-off stage j to j + 1 with its re-transmission counter incremented by 1. In addition, at the
state {m, 0}, the data from the sensor will either be successfully transmitted or discarded by the
sensor. The parameter pf represents the probability of transmission failure due to the inter-BAN
interference, which denotes the probability of ACK reception under collision of packets. The state
transition probabilities are:
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Algorithm 1 The Proposed MAC Layer Protocol
1: Initializing MAC Parameters when,W = CWmin , b = 0 ,w = 0
2: Hub send the sensor a beacon to sensor i with synchronization information
3: After receive the beacon, the sensor i transmit data using the scheduled slots.
4: if Hub successfully receives the packet then
5: end if
6: Sensor keeps inactive for a period of Tidle until the end of the superframe.
7: go to 2
8: i ← i + 1
9: close;
10: if The transmission fails because of the interference, the sensor will not receive the ACK then
11: b ← b + 1
12: if b > MaxRetransmissionLimit then
13: Discard The Packet
14: go to 2
15: end if
16: close;
17: The hub calculates the backoff length
18: Wb = λbCWmin
19: w = random{0,Wb }
20: Sensor keeps inactive for a period ofTidle , and starts back off until the end of the superframe.
21: w ← w − 1
22: if w = 0 then
23: go to 2
24: close;
25: end if
26: end if

Pr ((i, j − 1)|(i, j)) = 1
Pr ((i + 1, j)|(i, 0)) = pf 1Wi
Pr ((0, 0)|(i, 0)) = 1 − pf
Pr ((0, 0)|(0, 0)) = 1 − pf
, (1)
whereWi = 2iCWmin , i ≥ 1.
3.3.1 Steady-State Solution. To complete the construction of the Markov chain in Fig. 1, a form
solution for the Markov chain is required.
Let the stationary distribution of the Markov chain be, bi, j = limt→∞ Pr (s(t) = i,b(t) = j), where
i ∈ (0,m), j ∈ (0,Wi ). Then, we can calculate the stationary distribution for all the values of bi, j . By
using the equation (1), bi, j can be expressed as functions of the value b0,0 and of the transmission
failure probability pf . b0,0 is finally determined by imposing the normalization condition:
b0,0 +
m∑
k=1
Wk∑
j=0
bk, j = 1 (2)
that simplifies to:
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Fig. 4. Markov Chain for Proposed MAC Scheme
b0,0 =
2(1 − pf )(1 − 2pf )
2CWminpf (1 − (2pf )m)(1 − pf ) + (2 + pf )(1 − pmf )(1 − 2pf )
(3)
We can now express the probability τ that a WBAN sensor attempts to carry out a superframe
transmission in a randomly chosen slot time. The transmission occurs when the backoff time
counter is equal to zero. Thus, we can write the probability τ :
τ =
m∑
k=0
bk,0 (4)
=
2(1 − 2pf )(1 − pm+1f )
2CWminpf (2 − (2pf )m)(1 − pf ) + (1 − 2pf )(2 + pf )(1 − pmf )
(5)
With probability τ , the probability of transmission failure pf is the intersection of the probability
of collision and the packet error rate (PER) :
pf = pc ∩ PER = (1 − PDR)(1 − (1 − ητ τ )N−1), (6)
where PDR is the packet deliver ratio and ητ is a coefficient that normalizes τ by the average
number of time slots staying in an arbitrary state of the Markov chain.
By using (5) and (6), the values of pf ,τ and b0,0 can be solved and used in performance metrics.
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3.4 Performance Validation
By comparing the analytical modeling with simulation results, we can evaluate the accuracy of
the Markov Model described in the previous section. We simulated N single-link star topology
WBANs co-existing in the saturated regime (all WBANs always have a packet to transmit). A
performance analysis is also conducted based on the steady-state solutions. We assumed when
intra-WBAN interference occurs that the packets collision will result in transmission failure pf = pc
as PER = 1(PDR = 0).
In our experiment, the data rate is set as 32 kbit s−1. The retransmissions limits m = 4, and
the minimum back-off length CWmin = 64. The duration of one superframe is Ts = 64ms . Each
superframe consist of 256 time slots. Each time slot last for Tslot = 250µs . The beacon, payload and
the ACK are set to be 30,110,10 bytes respectively.
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Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show that, in terms of Probability of Collision and Goodput (S), the analytical
model matches the simulation results accurately. Goodput is defined as the ratio between time
elapsed successfully delivering a packet and the total time. Analytically, the goodput is calculated
as:
Goodput(S) = (1 − pf )τTpayload
τTs + (1 − τ )Tslot ,
(7)
where
Ts = Tbeacon +Tpayload +Tack +Tidle (8)
Tbeacon ,Tpayload ,Tack ,Tidle represent the duration of beacon, payload, ACK and idle respectively.
However, weak matching occurs when less WBANs are co-existing, as randomness of the back-off
counter in the simulation is relatively large. Fig. 6 shows that when more WBANs are co-located,
the system’s Goodput decreases as the collision probability increases.
4 LINK ADAPTATION GAME ALGORITHM
The majority of existing game theoretic algorithms inWBANs only focus on transmit power control.
However, when considering saturated traffic conditions, in particular interfering networks, selfishly
changing the transmit power may increases packet losses, and thus, reduce the overall throughput.
Thus, we observed that greater system efficiency can be achieved by varying performance-impacting
characteristic such as modulation or data rate.
One of the objectives in this paper is to exploit the above MAC layer scheme to find a method
that can further increases the system’s energy efficiency and reduce inference. In this section, we
develop a utility-based game theory model that is a function of two variables: transmission power
and data rate to address interference and packet contentions. The transmitter chooses the value of
the transmit power and data rate to maximize energy efficiency whilst meeting the packet delivery
ratio (PDR) requirements. Since the transmitter’s action will be a function of the choice of data rate
and transmit power. Therefore, the two parameters need to be executed jointly.
According to experimental results, an increase in data rate can result in WBAN’s packet delivery
ratio degradation in the same SINR regime. However, the length of payload transmission time is also
related to the WBAN’s data rate, so that higher data rate may also reduce the intra-WBAN packet
collision possibility as the transmission time is reduced accordingly, and thus mitigate interference.
Furthermore, the proposed game theoretic algorithm handles packet re-transmissions, until the
retry limit is reached. In addition, it should be noted that all game associated calculations are made
by the hub, hence there will be no extra computational cost for the sensors.
4.1 Game-theoretic System Model
We consider the system model of the form described in Section 2.1 where multiple WBANs are co-
located. All WBANs are within each others interference range, and the corresponding transmitters
always have packets to send. TDMA schemes with the same random back-off scheduling mechanism
are applied for all WBANs and the minimum back off slot length cannot be changed. There are no
pre-assigned priorities among different WBANs such that all links can expect identical priorities
in traffic. Formally, we define the Link Adaptation Game in normal form as G = {N, (P,R),U },
notation described in the following sub-sections.
4.2 Players
Each co-existing WBAN is a player in the Link Adaptation Game, the player set is denoted by
N = {1, 2, 3...N }. Within each WBAN, the sensor(transmitter) adapts its power and data rate by
utilizing the game-theoretic algorithms.
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4.3 Action Set
We require that the data rate of WBAN i , Ri is chosen from a discrete finite set R = {Rmin , ...,Rmax },
where Rmin is the base rate and Rmax is the maximum data rate. In each packet transmission, and
variations in Ri result in variations in packet delivery ratio (PDR). In addition, each WBAN can
adjust its power Pi ∈ [Pmin , Pmax ]. Thus the action selected by any player i is defined as the pair
Ai = (Pi ,Ri ), where Pi is the transmit power of player i and Ri is the data rate of player i . The
aggregation of all players action is denoted as A = (P,R) = {A1,A2...An}.
4.4 Utility Function
It is obvious that each player is always trying to maximizing its own utility. However, due to the
non-cooperative nature of this game, it is easy to see that in an attempt to maximize its own benefits
at any cost, each WBAN is likely to consume maximum power, and the highest data rate. This will
also create excessive interference, leading to performance degradation. A pricing mechanism is
then also introduced to penalize the use of excessive power. The utility function of each player is
defined as follows:
U (P ,R) = −C(P) + ln(1 + PDR(P ,R)) +G(R), (9)
where,
C(P) = c · Pд
G(R) = −q · 1
R
(10)
the coefficients in the cost function c,д,q are positive constants that can be tuned depending
on channel conditions. The linear cost function (where the exponent д = 1) is commonly used in
the literature, however, in the proposed game д are generally greater than 1 to provide strictly
concavity. c,q are constant non-negative weighting factors.
In equation (9), a sigmoid approximation of PDR is introduced. This model has been shown to be
capable of approximating the PDR versus SINR of a wireless channel. Here, the SINR is defined as:
γi =
hiiPi∑N
j=1, j,i hi jPj + σ
2
, (11)
where, hi j represents the channel attenuation between WBAN i and WBAN j. hii denotes the
on-body channel attenuation in WBAN i. σ is the noise gain. The sigmoid PDR function of SINR is
presented as follows:
PDR = exp
(
α · γ β
)
(12)
Fig. 7 shows the comparison between approximated and simulated PDR vs. SINR for different
data rate (R1 ∼ R5) respectively. The sets of parameters α , β of the sigmoid model in the equation
above that best approximate the simulation curves are selected by computer-aided search and
summarized in Table 3:
Table 2. Coefficients for PDR Estimation
Data Rate α β
R1 = 25.6kbps -100.02 -3.66
R2 = 51.2kbps -214.95 -2.82
R3 = 76.8kbps -663.69 -2.79
R4 = 102.4kbps -1182.7 -2.73
R5 = 128.0kbps -1433.5 -2.58
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4.5 Nash Equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies that guarantee the best response of each player with
respect to the chosen utility. In the proposed non-cooperative game, the game is played by rational
players, which implies that every player adopts the strategy achieving the Nash Equilibrium.
Definition 1. Let A∗ = (P∗,R∗) be the Nash Equilibrium in the Link Adaptation Game, then for
every i ∈ N :
U (P∗i ,R∗i ) ≥ U {(Pi ,Ri ), P∗−i ,R∗−i }, (13)
where, (P−i,R−i) represents all other player strategies except for player i . At the end of every
transmission (say t ), players update their next transmit power and rate jointly to maximize the
outcome of adapting the utility function based on the current SINR:
{Pi (t + 1),Ri (t + 1)} = argmaxU {(Pi (t),Ri (t)), P∗−i ,R∗−i } (14)
The action profile P∗ = (P∗1 , P∗2 , P∗3 ...P∗n) for n ≥ 2 is a Nash Equilibrium, is the best response
towards P∗−i .
4.6 Existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
The existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium of the proposed game are proved as follows:
Lemma 1. The action space A = (P ,R) is not a convex set. However, under the condition that R is
fixed, A = (P ,R) is a convex set.
Proof. We simply choose two points, A1 = (Pmax ,R1), A2 = (Pmax ,R2) that have the same power
component. A line connecting these points consists of only two pointsA1,A2 themselves. The intervening
points on this line do not belong to (P ,R). Hence, (P ,R) is not convex. However, suppose the data rate is
fixed at, say R1 . We note that a convex combination A′ = ΛA′1 + (1 − Λ)A′2, Λ ∈ [0, 1], where A′1 =
(P1,R1),A′2 = (P2,R1) are any two arbitrarily selected actions in A, such that Pmin < P1, P2 < Pmax
belongs to the set A. Hence the set A is convex when R is fixed.
Theorem 2. (Existence) The game G admits at least one Nash Equilibrium, when assuming R is
fixed.
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Proof. In gameG , for WBAN i , i ∈ N the following condition can be verified. When the data rate
of WBAN i is fixed, the action set A = (P ,R) is a nonempty, convex, bounded in finite dimension vector
space as proved in Lemma 1. The utility function U is continuous for all Pi ∈ [Pmini , Pmaxi ]. As the
first derivative of the utility functionU is well defined as:
δUi
δPi
= −c · дPд−1 +
(
1 − 1(1 + PDRi )
)
αβ
γ
β
i
Pi
, (15)
where |h
i
i (ki ) |2
I−i =
γi
Pi
, therefore, as Pi ∈ [Pmini , Pmaxi ] is real and the PDRi is non-zero, the Theorem 2 is
proved.
Theorem 3. (Uniqueness): The Nash Equilibrium in each stage of the game G is unique, and
independent of history so it is a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Proof. The second derivative of U (·) is shown to be always negative ∀i , so that U (·) is strictly
concave.
δ 2Ui
δP2i
= −c · д(д − 1)Pд−2i +
(
1 − 1(1 + PDRi )
)
γ
β
i αβ(β − 1)/P2i
− PDRi(1 + PDRi )2α
2β2γ
2β
i /P2i , (16)
where PDRi is always positive and between (0,1), and the term (β − 1) is less than 0. In additionw is
positive, thus δ
2Ui
δP 2i
< 0. Therefore the utility function has a global maximum at P∗i which occurs at the
point where δUδPi = 0.
However, in practice, the data rate R is not always fixed. Hence, we need to make sure that the
game only admits a unique Nash Equilibrium solution over the action space A. As the concavity of
the utility function leads to the uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium, we use the concept of potential
game[22], which provides useful properties concerning the justification of Nash equilibrium.
4.7 Forming a Potential Game
For game G, when at high PDR regime (where the system usually operates), we can obtain the
following approximation by using Taylor expansion for the last term in the utility function (13):
ln(1 + PDR(Ai ,A−i )) = ln(1 + exp(α · γ β )) ≈ ln(2) + α · γ
β
2 +
(α · γ β )2
8 ... (17)
Substitute this approximation in to the utility function (only takes the first order term), we can
get the a new game with utility function defined as:
UPi (P ,R) = −c · Pдi + q ·
1
Ri
+ ln(2) + α(Ri ) · γ
β (Ri )
2 ≈ U (P ,R) (18)
Thus we transform the game G to a potential game denoted by GP = {N,A,UP }, whereUP is the
new utility function.
We firstly provide the definition of the exact potential game, and proceed to show that the game
belongs to the class of exact potential games.
Definition 2. A game is said to be an exact potential game if there exists a function satisfying:
U (Si , S−i ) −U (Ti , S−i ) = F (Si , S−i ) − F (Ti , S−i ), (19)
where F is called the potential function that can map the action space of the game in to a real space.
ACM Trans. Sensor Netw., Vol. 9, No. 4, Article 39. Publication date: March 2010.
Game Theory Interference Mitigation for Time-Division MAC in WBAN 39:15
Algorithm 2Main steps for Link Adaptation Game
1: Initializing MAC Parameters when, CW = CWmin , b = 0 ,w = 0
2: Hub sends a beacon to sensor i with synchronization information
3: After receiving the beacon, the sensor i transmits data using the scheduled slots with (P(t),R(t)).
4: if Hub successfully receives the packet then
5: The Hub choosing the transmit power and rate for next transmission by equation (14) :
{Pi (t + 1),Ri (t + 1)} = argmaxU {(Pi ,Ri ), P∗−i,R∗−i}
6: Sensor keeps inactive for a period of Tidle until the end of the superframe.
7: go to 2
8: i ← i + 1
9: t ← t + 1
10: close;
11: else if The transmission fails because of the interference, the sensor will not receive the ACK
then
12: b ← b + 1
13: if b > MaxRetransmissionLimit then
14: Discard The Packet
15: go to 2
16: close;
17: end if
18: The Hub choosing the transmit power and rate for next transmission by equation (14) :
{Pi (t + 1),Ri (t + 1)} = argmaxU {(Pi ,Ri ), P∗−i,R∗−i}
19: The hub calculates the backoff length
20: W = λbCWmin
21: w = random{0,CW }
22: Sensor keeps inactive for a period ofTidle , and starts back off until the end of the superframe.
23: w ← w − 1
24: if w = 0 then
25: go to 2
26: t ← t + 1
27: close;
28: end if
29: end if
The Game GP is an exact potential game, with a potential function defined as:
Fi (A) =
∑
−cPwi − q
1
Ri
+
α(Ri ) · γ β (Ri )
2 (20)
Notice that we discard ln(2) in the utility function when constructing the potential function as
the constants can be canceled out. We can see that F satisfies the Definition 2.1 in [20],
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Fi = −cPдi − q
1
Ri
+
α(Ri ) · γ b(Ri )
2 +
∑
j,i
−cPwj − q
1
R j
+
α(R j ) · γ b(Rj )
2
and,
F (Ai ,A−i) − F (Ti ,A−i ) = −cPдi − q
1
Ri
+
α(Ri ) · γ b(Ri )
2 − cPT дi − q
1
RTi
+
α(RTi ) · γ b(RTi )
2 = UP (Ai ,A−i ) −UP (Ti ,A−i ), (21)
where Ti = (PTi ,RTi ), and thus it is a potential function of the game GP . Also, game GP is a best
response potential game, which defined as :
Definition 3. The gameG is a best-response game if and only if a potential function F exists such
that,
argmaxU (Ai ,A−i ) = argmax F (Ai ,A−i ) (22)
According to [31], this leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 4. For best-response game G defined over action space A, with a potential function F . If
A ∈ A maximizes F , then it is a Nash Equilibrium for G.
4.8 Large Midpoint Property and Discrete Concavity
For an exact potential game, the change of the potential function attributes the same amount of
change in a player’s utility function due to its strategy deviation. A concave potential function
guarantees that every Nash equilibrium of the game also maximizes a potential function.
Therefore, with the help of the results in [29] on discrete concavity for potential games, we can
prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium inGp : since the maximizer in the potential function
F is unique, so is the Nash Equilibrium in game G.
According to [29] the Large Midpoint Property (LMP) is defined as:
Definition 4. For a function defined over discrete set satisfies LMP if for any x ,y ∈ X with
|x − y | = 2 ,
max
|x−z |= |z−y |=1
f (z) =
{
>min{ f (x), f (y)}, if f (x) , f (y)
≥ f (x) = f (y), otherwise (23)
We show that the potential function satisfies the LMP the discrete strategy R. As the choice of
data rate [Rmin ,Rmax ] is discrete, and P is continuous. We can have the following proposition:
Theorem 5. For a certain power strategy P ∈ P , the potential function F (A) , where A = (P ,R)
satisfies LMP for R ∈ R.
Proof. See in Appendix B.
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Suppose thatA = (P ,R) satisfies LMP forR ∈ R. Then, only if F (A = (P ,Rx ),A−i ) ≥
F (A = (P ,Ry ),A−i ) for all y, F (A = (P ,Rx ),A−i ) ≥ F (A = (P ,Ry ),A−i ) for all |x − y | ≤ 1
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This means that if LMP is satisfied for a discrete potential function, then the local optimality in
the potential function implies global optimality. Thus, when at a certain transmit power level, only
one maximizer exists over the discrete set of data rate. The proof of the Proposition 6 is shown in
Appendix C.
As Theorem3 shows that when R is fixed, the utility function admits one optimizer (maximizer).
Hence, for exact potential game, the potential function also admits unique maximizer. Thus we
have
Theorem 7. The maximizer in the action space A, namely Ao = argmax F (Ai ,A−i ) is unique
and:
F (Ao ,A−i ) = max{F ((P∗min ,Rmin),A−i ), ...F ((P∗max ,Rmax ),A−i )}, (24)
where, P∗x is the maximizer when R = Rx .
To show that the equilibrium of the propose potential game is unique, it is sufficient to prove
that the set of maximizers of the potential function is singleton. Therefore, the best-response for
the potential game G, A∗ = (P∗,R∗) is equals to Ao , which is also unique.
4.9 Game Efficiency
The Nash Equilibrium solution of each individual BAN in the game G is the maximization of
its own utility. This leads to the problem of efficiency of the network. More specifically, for a
network without a central coordinator, the fairness of the system may degrade due to selfish
actions of the players. Thus, it is important to investigate the equilibrium efficiency among the
co-existing WBANs. The social welfare reflects the fairness and efficiency of the system’s best
response, considering all individuals utility combined.
Definition 5. The social welfare is defined by the aggregation sum of eachWBAN’s utility function
as:
Ω(A) =
n∑
i=0
Ui (A) (25)
The maximization of the social welfare is the social optimum, which represents the social fairness
among the system. The price of anarchy (PoA) is used to measure the inefficiency of equilibriums
among selfish players. With finite number of players in game G, the PoA 1 is defined as the ration
of the highest value of social welfare (social optimum) to the NE (as the Nash Equilibrium in G is
unique) of the game:
PoA = Ω(A
opt)
Ω(A∗) ≥ 1, (26)
where Aopt = argmaxΩ(A) is the global optimum solution.
5 THE ADAPTIVE BACKOFF GAME
By implementing the proposed back-off algorithms, the collision during the frame transmission
can possibly be avoided. Because, before each transmission, each WBAN waits for a random time,
based on Contention Window size. This mechanism space out repeated retransmissions of the data
in each WBAN. Generally, each WBAN is able to tune their transmission probability by modifying
the back-off control parameters, such as CWmin value and maximum back-off stages (m value).
1Since the Nash Equilibrium is unique, the the price of anarchy equals to the price of stability(PoS)
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Therefore, each WBAN can dynamically choose a suitable contention window size according to the
contention level of current network in order to effectively improve system performance.
However, due to the non-cooperative nature of the system, each selfish player attempts to increase
its utility by increasing its transmission probability or equivalent by decreasing its contention
window size. Increasing the transmission probability by one player encourages other players to
shorten their contention window sizes, which increases collisions, thus the delay and packets drop
ratios are also increased. Here, we proposed the Contention GameGCW based on the aforementioned
MAC layer scheduling, which aims to balance the trade-off between packet delay and system
throughput.
In the Contention Game, the action selected by any player is their minimum contention windows
size CWmin , where CWmin is the action space. As described by the Markov Model, by changing the
contention window size, players transmission probability can be adjusted accordingly. As, in a high
PDR regime, we have the following approximation:
τ ≈ 1
pf ·CWmin + 1 , (27)
where pf is transmission failure probability.
Empirically, in order to get the value of n, each node can measure pf and τ through several
counters independently. The number of coexisting WBANs can be estimated from the following
equations[10]:
τest =
TransmittedFraдmentCount
SlotCount
pest =
AckFailureCount
TransmittedFramentCount
,
(28)
where pest and τest denote the estimated τ , failure probability respectively.
TransmittedFragmentCounter that counts the total number of successfully transmitted data
frames, ACKFailureCounter that counts the total number of unsuccessfully transmitted data frames
and the SlotCounter that counts the total number of experienced time slots. (The historical data
can be used to estimate the current parameters, and the length of how far we should trace back can
be adjusted accordingly).
Algorithm 3Main steps for Adaptive Backoff Game
1: After execute line 19 in Algorithm 2
2: The Hub estimated the number of coexisting WBANs nest by using equation (28)
3: After obtain nest . The Utility Function V (CWmin) can be constructed as a function ofw , where
the PDR is obtained as PDR(P∗−i,R∗−i) from the Nash Equilibrium in the Link Adaptation Game.
4: Determine the minimum contention window size CWmin for that given sensor, which gives
the Nash Equilibrium value of the Utility Function V (CWmin)
5: go to 22 in Algorithm 2
The objective of the game is to reach a trade-off in maximizing the throughput, and minimize
delay. Following from the analytical model, the throughput of each WBANs is positively correlated
with the Goodput(S) in equation (7). The average delay for a packet to be transmitted successfully
is estimated as:
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D =
m∑
i=1
PBiE[Di ]
=
m−1∑
i=1
[pif (1 − pf )
i∑
j=0
(Wj + 12 Tslot +Ts )]
+ pmf
m∑
j=0
(Wj + 12 Tslot +Ts ),
(29)
where E[Di ] is the average delay in state i . It is obvious that throughput, delay may have different
units in different ranges, and they have to be normalized. Therefore, the utility function is defined
as the following:
Vi (CWmin) = d · S − l · D − PDrop, (30)
where PDrop = τPm+1 is the probability that a packet drops due to exceed maximum retry
limits. The weights d, l can be adjusted based on different scenarios. The obtained results have
shown that in game GCW , each user improves its chance of successful transmission by increasing
transmission probability, whilst this increase of transmission probability causes an increase in
collision probability, as well. Such collisions will cause large delay in packets transmission and
energy wastage led by PDR reduction. Thus, in case of less contending nodes(or high SINR regime),
the nodes should select a smaller CWmin as the best strategy. In the case of more contending
nodes(or low SINR regime), greater CWmin is more appropriate in order to reduce the collision
probability. The game is implemented in a similar distributed manner to the Link Adaptation Game.
5.1 Game Property
The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium point for the Adaptive Backoff game is
guaranteed. The proof is given as follows.
5.1.1 Existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 8. (Existence and Uniqueness): In each stage of the game GCW exists a unique Nash
Equilibrium.
Proof. Similar with the Link Adaptation Game G, the utility function in GCW is differentiable
and strictly concave over the convex set of the minimum contention window size CWmin . Therefore,
according to [14], the game GCW admits a unique Nash Equilibrium. The details can be found in
Appendix A.
5.1.2 Efficiency. Similarly with the Link Adaptation Game the social welfare of the Adaptive
Backoff Game GCW is defined as :
ΩCW =
n∑
i=0
Vi (31)
With finite number of players in gameGCW the PoA is defined as the ration of the highest value
of social welfare (global optimization) to the NE (as the Nash Equilibrium in GCW is unique) of the
game:
PoACW =
ΩCW (Bopt)
ΩCW (B∗) ≥ 1, (32)
where Bopt = argmaxΩCW(B) is the global optimum solution.
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6 SIMULATION ANALYSIS
This section discusses the simulation results of our proposed MAC layer games in contrast with
conventional schemes as well as game-theory based methods in the literatures. To evaluate and
validate the performance of the proposed game, we compare throughput, energy efficiency and
delay with B2RIS[12] and Adaptive CSMA/CA [32] in respect of varying numbers of consisting
WBANs in our simulations. The value of MAC layer Parameters are listed as below, which is mainly
based on the IEEE802.15.6 standard (described in section 2.4). In addition, a non-linear power
estimation [6] is also made to measure the actual circuit energy consumptions, to provide a more
realistic evaluation of the system.
Table 3. MAC Parameter
Parameters Value
Superframe Length 80ms
Allocated Time Slot Length 0.312ms
Minimum Data Rate 25.6 kbit s−1
Maximum Data Rate 1.28 Mbits s−1
Payload 175 bytes
NMAC Hdr 24 bits
NMAC Ftr 24 bits
NBeacon 20 bytes
NACK 10 bytes
CWmin 43.75 ms
MaxBackoffLimits (m) 4
6.1 Scenario 1
In this scenario, a realistic measurement [28] using small body-mounted "channel sounder" radios
that operated at 2.36 Ghz is adopted in the simulation. The measurement set contains both inter-
WBAN and intra-WBAN channels of the co-existing WBANs, which are measured on human
wearers in many different environments, involving subjects doing a mix of distinctive everyday
activities. It should also be noted that the measurements are re-sampled by the parameters above,
thus the channel attenuations remain constant in each superframe [7].
Figures 8 and 9 show the variation in throughput and delay, respectively, with different numbers
of WBAN co-existing. Fig. 8 shows that the throughput is much reduced with more WBANs in
the system as the collision probability is increased. In B2IRS, the packets are rescheduled in a
collision-free manner, hence no interference occurs. The proposed games provide lower delay and
higher throughput compared with other methods. The Adaptive Backoff Game outperforms the
Link Adaptation Game in terms of delay and average throughput although the Link Adaptation
Game is superior in terms of power consumption and PDR. However, when larger number of
WBANs are co-located the advantage of the contention window length game will be more obvious,
which is shown in the next section.
6.2 Scenario 2
The measurement set used can only provide channel gain of up to 6 WBANs coexisting, computer-
simulated channels are also needed to obtain performance analysis under crowded environment
where many more WBANs are co-located.
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Fig. 8. Throughput Performance of the proposed games compared to other methods under Realistic Measure-
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Fig. 9. Delay Performance of the proposed games compared to other methods under Realistic Measurement
Channel Sets
In the simulation, both intra-BAN and inter-BAN channels are modeled. It is assumed that up to
15 WBANs with the same topology are coexisting and moving randomly within a 6 × 6m2 square
area. The walking speed of the WBAN wearer is modeled as 0.5 ± 0.1 m/s, which is updated every
1 ms. The channel attenuation is modeled as hji = At (do/d ji )(2.5/2)ASEASC , where the path loss
exponent is 2.5. d ji represents the distance between BAN i and j , and the reference distance do = 5m
corresponds to a channel attenuation of 50 dB. The shadowing effect ASE is assumed to be 42dB,
and a Jakes model with Doppler spread of 1.1 Hz as the CN(0, 1) Rayleigh distribed small scale
fading ASC between WBANs. Gamma fading with a mean 65 dB attenuation, a shape parameter of
1.31, and a scale parameter of 0.562 is employed for the on-body channels.
ACM Trans. Sensor Netw., Vol. 9, No. 4, Article 39. Publication date: March 2010.
39:22 Y. Yang, D. Smith
2 3 4 5 6
Number of WBANs
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
PD
R 
in 
Av
er
ag
e
Link Adaptation Game*
Social Optimal PHY Game[8]
Adaptive Backoff Game*
B2IRS[12]
Adaptive CSMA/CA[16]
Fig. 10. PDR performance of the proposed games compared to other methods under Realistic Measurement
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Fig. 11. Circuit power consumption of the proposed games compared to other methods under Realistic
Measurement Channel Sets
Basically, for the proposed methods, less than 10% of the packets are blocked. Again, PDR
performances of B2IRS and adaptive CSMA/CA are better than others, because of the low collision
probabilities in these two methods.
In Figure 13, there is increasing delay with increase in the number of co-locatedWBANs. Amongst
three game-theory-based methods, Social Optimal PHY Game has the highest delay due to large
re-transmissions. The Adaptive Backoff Game provides smallest packet delay, and the delay time is
increased a small amount at higher interference regime. At the same time, B2IRS has the largest
delay due to complexity of beacon re-scheduling when greater number of WBANs are co-existing.
As described in Figure 14, when more than 4 WBANs co-exiting, the Adaptive Backoff Game
can provides higher throughput. Both two proposed methods have significantly larger throughput
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Fig. 12. Throughput performance of the proposed games compared to other methods under Simulated
Channel Sets
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Fig. 13. Delay performance of the proposed games compared to other methods under Simulated Channel
Sets
respect to other methods, as higher date rate are more preferable in the game at relative better
channel conditions.
By applying the non-linear circuit power mapping [6], the circuit power consumptions can be
estimated. The proposed Link Adaptation Game method provides the lowest power consumption
in terms of Joules per bit (J/bit). The B2IRS consumes 10 times more power per bit transmitted.
However, the Adaptive Backoff Game uses slightly larger power than the Link Adaptation Game.
This is because, in the Adaptive Backoff Game, when the contention windows size is small, more
packets are transmitted concurrently, hence the transmitter uses larger power to achieve reasonable
PDR.
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Fig. 15. Circuit power consumption of the proposed games compared to other methods under Simulated
Channel Sets
6.3 Efficiency of the Game
Social efficiency is a key measurement for a reliable and efficient game design. We evaluate the
Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the two prosed games by implementing a Monte Carlo simulation
on time varying channels, where an interior point approach is applied to find the centralized
(global) optimum of the social welfare. Although, different WBANs decide their actions in different
time slots, we assume the global maximization point is solved instantaneously despite MAC layer
scheduling.
Figs. 16 and 17 above illustrate the PoA for different numbers of co-existing WBANs. It can be
seen that the loss due to decentralization is relatively small as PoA → 1. Also, in general , the
system waste less than 10% of their welfare in terms of utility for not being coordinated from both
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Fig. 16 and Fig. 17. Meanwhile, we introduce a new metrics L,LCW :
L = exp(Ω(A
κ )
Ω(A∗) ), (33)
and,
LCW = exp(ΩCW (B
κ )
ΩCW (B∗) ), (34)
where Aκ ∈ A,Aκ = argminΩ(A), and Bκ ∈ B, Bκ = argminΩCW(B). L, LCW correlated with the
ratio of the worst value of the social welfare and the maximum value of the social welfare in game
G andGCW respectively (we take the exponential as sometime the value of utility function can be
negative). These two metrics represent the gap between the system’s best possible performance and
the worst case scenario. The comparison between L,LCW and exp( 1PoA ) and exp( 1PoACW ) provides
some insight of how stable the Nash equilibrium is across iterations of the game. Hence, in Table 4,
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Table 4. Comparison of exp( 1PoA ) and the mean value of L
No. of WBANs L exp( 1PoA )
2 6.832e-32 2.718
5 4.252e-32 2.704
8 2.291e-32 2.562
11 2.728e-32 2.549
14 1.141e-32 2.542
Table 5. Comparison of exp( 1PoACW ) and the mean value of LCW
No. of WBANs LCW exp( 1PoACW )
2 2.2445 2.7056
5 2.0317 2.7175
8 1.5793 2.7183
11 1.5746 2.7183
14 1.5864 2.7183
we illustrate the comparison between the mean value of L and exp( 1PoA ) when different number of
WBANs are co-located. Meanwhile, the comparison between LCW and exp( 1PoACW ) is depicted in
in Table 5.
Comparing with exp( 1PoA ), L is much more smaller. It is because the social welfare varies a
significant amount over the action space. Thus, in Link Adaptation Game, the system is socially
stable as the deviation from the social optimum solution is small. On the other hand, in contention
game, the values of LCW are relatively large. However, it can be seen that, the PoACW is close to 1,
which represents complete stability of the game.
7 CONCLUSION
An insightful game theory model has been proposed to adaptively adjust transmit power and data
rate to mitigate inter-WBAN interference level while reducing overall energy consumption. The
model is based on a novel contention-based MAC layer protocol with special back-off mechanism,
which reduces packet collision probability. Besides, another game that can optimize the length of
back-off is proposed in order to reduce average delay and increase system throughput. To compare
with some alternative state-of-art approaches, we conducted several simulations for both empirical
and simulated channels. The simulation results reveal that the proposed methods outperform
state-of-art, in terms of energy consumption, and overall quality-of-service (QoS).
Although, both of the proposed methods have PoA→ 1 and are very close to the social optimum,
such optimum is not guaranteed at the game’s Nash Equilibrium. If such a guarantee could be
provided that would be a further significant advance. Furthermore, as described above, in the
MAC layer protocol, the length of back-off period is randomly chosen. However, even without
prediction of the global channel state (channel gains), such randomness can provide efficient
collision avoidance. But more precise allocation can be made if channel state information can be
accurately predicted. Thus, current further work includes channel prediction, potentially improving
overall throughput by offering a reduction in packet collision rate. Meanwhile, machine learning,
such as reinforcement learning, is also regarded as a further potential improvement.
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Appendix A PROOF OF THEOREM 8
Firstly, the utility function (30) denoted as:
V = d · S − c · D − PDrop (35)
It can be seen that the first derivative of the utility function is continuous:
d · ∂S
∂CW
=
∂S
∂τ
∂τ
∂CW
=
∂τ
∂CW
· (1 − P)Tpayload[Tslot + τ (Ts −Tslot)] − (Ts −Tslot)τ (1 − P)Tpayload)[Tslot + τ (Ts −Tslot)]2
= −(aCW + 1)−2 d(1 − P)TpayloadTslot[Tslot + τ (Ts −Tslot)]2
(36)
Hence, according to [27], in this contention game, the Nash equilibrium exists.
d · ∂
2S
∂CW 2
=
2d(1 − P)TpayloadTslot([Tslot + τ (Ts −Tslot)]2)τ 2(Ts −Tslot)
[Tslot + τ (Ts −Tslot)]4
+ 2τ 3
d(1 − P)TpayloadTslot
[Tslot + τ (Ts −Tslot)]2
(37)
Meanwhile, delay is a linear function of the contention window size, thus ∂2D
∂CW 2 = 0.
∂2PDrop
∂CW 2
= 2τ 3Pm+1, (38)
which should always be positive. Therefore, the second order derivative of the utility function can
be obtained as follows:
∂2v
∂CW 2
= − 2τ 3Pm+1 + 2τ 3 d(1 − P)TpayloadTslot[Tslot + τ (Ts −Tslot)]2
+
2d(1 − P)TpayloadTslot([Tslot + τ (Ts −Tslot)]2)τ 2(Ts −Tslot)
[Tslot + τ (Ts −Tslot)]4
(39)
When d is set in a reasonable range, ∂2v
∂CW 2 will always be less than zero. Hence, the utility
function is concave.
Appendix B PROOF OF THEOREM 5
In WBAN i , for any x ,y, z ∈ X , ∥x − y∥ = 2, ∥x − z∥ = ∥z − y∥ = 1, we have
F (Ai = (P ,Rx ),A−i ) = −cPдx − q 1Rx +
α(Rx ) · γ β (Rx )
2 +
∑
j,i
−cPwj − q
1
R j
+
α(R j ) · γ β (Rj )
2
= C(Px ) +G(Rx ) + H (Ai ) +Q(A−i ),
(40)
where H (Ai ) = H ((P ,Rx )) = α (Rx )·γ
β (Rx )
2 , Q(A−i ) =
∑
j,i −cPдj − q 1Rj +
α (Rj )·γ β (Rj )
2 . Meanwhile,
F (Az ,A−i ) and F (Ay ,A−i ) are expressed in a similar way.
Obviously, G(R) is strictly concave, and increase with R. Hence, 2G(Rz ) > G(Rx ) +G(Ry ). Also,
as shown in table 3, 0 > 2α(Rz ) > α(Rx ) + α(Ry ). When at high PDR regime, where γ > 0dB, as
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β(Rx ) increases with R and γ β (Rx ) > 0 is convex:
(γ β (Ry ) − γ β (Rz )) − (γ β (Rz ) − γ β (Rx )) > 0
α(Rx ) · {(γ β (Ry ) − γ β (Rz )) − (γ β (Rz ) − γ β (Rx ))} < 0
(41)
Also,
γ b (RX ) · {(α(Rx ) − α(Rz )) − (α(Rz ) − α(Ry ))} < 0 (42)
Combining equation 42 and equation 41:
α(Rx ) · {(γ β (Ry ) − γ β (Rz )) − (γ β (Rz ) − γ β (Rx ))}
+ γ β (RX ) · {(α(Rx ) − α(Rz )) − (α(Rz ) − α(Ry ))} < 0, (43)
and
α(Rx ) · {(γ b (Ry ) − γ b (Rz )) − (γ b (Rz ) − γ b (Rx ))}
+ γ b (RX ) · {(α(Rx ) − α(Rz )) − (α(Rz ) − α(Ry ))}
− (α(Rx ) − α(Rz ))(γ b (Ry ) − γ b (Rz )) − (α(Rz ) − α(Ry ))(γ b (Rz ) − γ b (Rx )) < 0
(44)
Thus:
α(Ry )γ β (Ry ) − 2α(Rz )γ β (Rz ) + α(Rx )γ β (Rx ) < 0, (45)
which means 2H (Ai = (P ,Rz )) ≥ H (Ai = (P ,Ry )) + H (Ai = (P ,Rx )), such that:
2F (Ai = (P ,Rz ),A−i ) > F ((P ,Rx ),A−i ) + F ((P ,Ry ),A−i ) (46)
Therefore, the potential function F satisfies Lemma1.
Appendix C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Let x satisfy F ((P ,Rx ),A−i ) ≥ F ((P ,Ry ),A−i ) for all y with |x − y | ≤ 1. For y with d = |x − y | ≥ 2,
we can make a sequence xdk=0 such that x
0 = x and xd = y with the following steps:
xk+1 ∈ argmax
|x−z |=1, |y−z |=d−k−1
F ((P ,Rz ),A−i ) (47)
Suppose |xk − z | = |xk+2 − z | = 1, then we have d − k = |xk −y | = |xk − z + z −y | ≤ |z −y | + 1.
Meanwhile, |z − y | = |z − xk+2 + xk+2 − y | ≤ |z − xk+2 | + |xk+2 − y | = d − k − 1. Therefore,
d − k − 1 = |z − y |, which gives the following equation:
F ((P ,Rxk+1 ),A−i ) = max|xk−z |=1, |z−y |=d−k−1 F ((P ,Rxz ),A−i ) ≥ max|xk−z |=xk+2−z |=1 F ((P ,Rxz ),A−i ) (48)
Since F satisfies LMP as proved above, for 0 ≤ k ≤ d − 2:
max
|x−z |= |z−y |=1
F ((P ,Rxk+1 ),A−i ) =

≥ F ((P ,Rxk ),A−i ) = F ((P ,Rxk+2 ),A−i )
, if F ((P ,Rxk ),A−i ) = F ((P ,Rxk+2 )
> min{F ((P ,Rxk ),A−i ), F ((P ,Rxk+2 ),A−i )}, otherwise
(49)
Since |x0 −x1 | = 1, F ((P ,Rx 0 ),A−i ) ≥ F ((P ,Rx 1 ),A−i ), Also, by using the above properties, for all
k we have: F ((P ,Rxk ),A−i ) ≥ F ((P ,Rxk+1 ),A−i ). Thus, by induction we can have F ((P ,Rx ),A−i ) =
F ((P ,Rx 0 ),A−i ) ≥ F ((P ,Rx 1 ),A−i )...F ((P ,Rxd−1 ),A−i ) ≥ F ((P ,Rxd ),A−i ) = F ((P ,Ry ),A−i ).
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